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The First Amendment in Chaos: How the
Law of Secondary Effects Is Applied and
Misapplied by the Circuit Courts
DANIEL

R.

AARONSON, GARY

S.

EDINGER, AND JAMES

S.

BENJAMINt

The law of secondary effects is a mess. Every federal circuit and
the various states seem to be on slightly different pages. That body of
law is supposed to govern when and to what extent the First Amendment
right of free speech can be limited in the context of sexually explicit
communications. In more vernacular terms: How far can local governments go to prevent or restrict the operation of strip clubs, adult bookstores, and the like? The present state of the law is both confused and
intellectually dishonest; the federal circuits are split on issues both large
and small, and the guidance offered to lower courts resembles instructions for operating a Ouija board. Forgive us a bit of editorializing at the
beginning of this Article, but partisan commentary seems appropriate
given the political and legal turmoil accompanying sexually explicit
speech.'
We learned in civics class that our society must tolerate a great deal
of public harm arising from controversial speech in order to safeguard
the larger principles of the First Amendment. For instance, we prefer to
allow white supremacists to spout their odious ideology while the rest of
us elect the first African American to the presidency. We are taught to
believe that anything short of "fighting words" must be endured if our
"market place of ideas" is to function.' Reality is less sanguine than
t The authors wish to acknowledge the substantial assistance of their friend and colleague,
Bradley Shafer, East Lansing, Michigan. Mr. Shafer wrote the Petition for Certiorari in the case of
Commonwealth v. Jameson, 215 S.W.3d 9 (Ky. 2006), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 190 (2007), which
in turn served as the template for the authors' petition in Daytona Grand, Inc. v. City of Daytona
Beach, 490 F.3d 860 (1 lth Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 1246 (2008). Those petitions
formed the basis for this Article.
1. In the interest of full disclosure, the authors of this Article are very much partisans in the
ongoing secondary-effects wars. Gary S. Edinger, Esq., Gainesville, Florida is National Chairman
and immediate past President of the First Amendment Lawyers' Association (FALA); Daniel R.
Aaronson, Esq., Benjamin & Aaronson, P.A., is National Secretary of FALA; and James S.
Benjamin, Esq., Benjamin & Aaronson, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, Florida is Chairman Emeritus and
past President of FALA; all concentrate their practice in First Amendment Constitutional litigation
matters.
2. Compare Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942) ("There are
certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of
which has never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem. These include the lewd and
obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or 'fighting' words ....
(footnote omitted)),
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civics class. While the Supreme Court has repeatedly said that sexually
explicit speech is entitled to protection under the First Amendment,3 the
Court has upheld many regulations just short of an outright ban so long
as local governments can demonstrate that the speech has an "adverse
secondary effect" on society. The purpose of this Article is not to debate
the legal underpinnings of the secondary-effects doctrine, but to review
the current difficulty in evaluating what quantum of evidence is sufficient to prove the existence of adverse secondary effects and to discuss
what "evidence" means in this context.
The doctrine of secondary effects was first mentioned in a footnote
appearing the Supreme Court case of Young v. American Mini Theatres,
Inc.4 That case is particularly important because a plurality of the
Supreme Court Justices considered for the first time the argument that
zoning restrictions targeting adult businesses were content-based rather
than content-neutral. 5 Curiously, however, the Court did not devote
much of the opinion to that central theoretical issue. Instead the Court
focused on the theatre's vagueness and equal-protection claims and paid
relatively little to the secondary-effects issue. That analysis was relegated to a footnote and a brief comment that the local government had
made a factual determination "that a concentration of 'adult' movie theaters causes the area to deteriorate and become a focus of crime. '"6
The Court expanded on this brief comment in City of Renton v.
Playtime Theatres, Inc.,' which was the first Supreme Court case to
focus on the nature of the evidence that might qualify as proof of secondary effects. The Court found that a variety of zoning tools could be
employed to limit adult businesses so long as those restrictions targeted
the secondary effects and were not being used as a tool to censor the
speech directly.8 The government could meet its burden of showing a
content-neutral purpose by showing that it relied on "studies" demonstrating a link between adult businesses and such social ills as reduction
in property values, increases in crime, and the spread of communicable
diseases. The test was purposely designed to be easy for government to
meet, since the locality was not required to conduct its own independent
with Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("[T]he best test
of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market ....).
3. See, e.g., United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 811 (2000); City
Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 289 (2000) (plurality opinion); Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc.,
501 U.S. 560, 565 (1991) (plurality opinion).
4. 427 U.S. 50 (1976).

5. See id. at 63-73 (plurality opinion).
6. Id. at 71 n.34.
7. 475 U.S. 41 (1986).

8. See id. at 50.
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studies but could rely on the experiences of other communities. 9 The
standard adopted is nominally an objective one:
We hold that Renton was entitled to rely on the experiences of Seattle
and other cities, and in particular on the "detailed findings" summarized in the Washington Supreme Court's Northend Cinema opinion,

in enacting its adult theater zoning ordinance. The First Amendment
does not require a city, before enacting such an ordinance, to conduct
new studies or produce evidence independent of that already generated by other cities, so long as whatever evidence the city relies upon
is reasonably believed to be relevant to the problem that the city

addresses. That was the case here. Nor is our holding affected by the
fact that Seattle ultimately chose a different method of adult theater

zoning than that chosen by Renton, since Seattle's choice of a different remedy to combat the secondary effects of adult theaters does not
call into question either Seattle's identification of those secondary
effects or the relevance of Seattle's experience to Renton.1 °

Since Renton, the Supreme Court has extended the secondaryeffects doctrine to apply to restrictions other than zoning. In particular,
prohibitions against nude dancing have been upheld by some Justices on
several occasions based on a perceived or potential link to secondary
effects.'" In addition, lower courts have expanded the list of social ills
associated with adult businesses to include such diverse problems as litter,12 traffic congestion,' 3 and tax evasion.' 4 The authors expect that climate change and the recent financial crisis will shortly join the list of
secondary effects uniquely caused by the adult industry. This may simply be by hyperbole, but as will be shown below, accuracy and logic are
not components of the secondary-effects analysis.
One difficulty faced in applying these three cases-particularly

9. Id. at 50-51.
10. Id. at 51-52.
11. See, e.g., City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 292 (2000) (plurality opinion); Barnes
v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 563, 567-68 (1991) (plurality opinion).
12. See, e.g., World Wide Video of Wash., Inc. v. City of Spokane, 368 F.3d 1186, 1195 (9th
Cir. 2004) (approving a restriction of speech based on litter). Yet, approving a restriction on
speech based on the possibility of litter would seem especially dubious in light of abundant
Supreme Court precedent stating that the First Amendment is more important than the occasional
bit of trash. See, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 799 n.7 (1989); Members of
City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 808-09 (1984); Schneider v. New Jersey,
308 U.S. 147, 162 (1939). World Wide Video is a particularly good example of the mental
contortions engaged in by some courts to uphold restrictions on sexually explicit speech.
13. See, e.g., Fantasyland Video, Inc. v. County of San Diego, 505 F.3d 996, 1002 (9th Cir.
2007) (holding that an adult business had failed to rebut the government's reliance on "traffic and
noise").
14. See, e.g., SOB, Inc. v. County of Benton, 317 F.3d 856, 863 (8th Cir. 2003).
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Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc. 5 and City of Erie v. Pap's A.M. 6-is the
fact that the decisions are fractured so badly that it is often difficult even
to identify the plurality opinion.' 7 It is little wonder, then, that the lower
courts have fractured along the same fault lines, applying the Supreme
Court precedent in a seemingly random development of the law. At best,
the law that developed after Barnes and Erie may be described as
dysfunctional.
In the Eleventh Circuit, the court has both upheld and stricken laws
that prohibited the sale of alcoholic beverages in the presence of nude
dance. In Sammy's of Mobile, Ltd. v. City of Mobile, the court upheld
such a restriction even in light of a recent Supreme Court case holding
that the Twenty-First Amendment did not grant local government additional authority to regulate nude-dance performances.' 8 In contrast, in
Krueger v. City of Pensacola,the Eleventh Circuit struck a very similar
ordinance because that ordinance had not been supported by any evidence of adverse secondary effects' 9:
Where such fundamental interests as the right to free speech are at
issue, however, we require more than simply an articulation of some
legitimate interest that the city could have had ....

The government

must also show that the articulated concern had more than merely
speculative factual grounds, and that it was actually a motivating factor in the passage of the legislation."0
In yet another departure, the court approved a district-court deci15. 501 U.S. 560.
16. 529 U.S. 277.
17. Legal commentators have been unanimous in pointing out the near impossibility of
applying these fractured opinions to actual cases. See, e.g., Roger Enriquez et al., A Legal and
Empirical Perspective on Crime and Adult Establishments: A Secondary Effects Study in San
Antonio, Texas, 15 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. PoL'Y & L. 1, 39 (2006) ("The post-Alameda
jurisprudence makes it clear that courts are struggling with the issue of 'quantum and quality' of
evidence necessary to establish an association or link between sexually oriented businesses and
negative secondary effects."); Christopher J. Andrew, Note, The Secondary Effects Doctrine: The
Historical Development, Current Application, and Potential Mischaracterizationof an Elusive
Judicial Precedent, 54 RUTGERS L. REv. 1175, 1212 (2002) ("Alameda Books, on the other hand,
represents a missed opportunity for the Court to come to a decision on the intricacies of secondary
effects analysis, which would be useful once the Court begins applying the analysis consistently
outside the area of adult entertainment regulations. It seems clear that the evidentiary burdens and
legislative motivations are not entirely clear from the fractured nature of many of the recent
secondary effects opinions and the different discussions and rationales that are provided
throughout these opinions."); Christy A. Fisher, Comment, Nude Dancing, 6 GEO. J. GENDER & L.
335, 335 (2005) ("Restrictions on nude dancing implicate the First and Fourteenth Amendments
of the U.S. Constitution. Courts have issued vague and contradictory opinions on the topic,
making the conflict between constitutional protections of erotic expression and public decency
laws even more confusing.").
18. 140 F.3d 993, 996-97 (11 th Cir. 1998).
19. 759 F.2d 851, 855 (11 th Cir. 1985).
20. Id.
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sion that precluded adult businesses from even offering evidence to challenge a secondary-effects finding. The district court noted,
Evidence about secondary effects or, rather, the lack of them, is also
clearly foreclosed. It is now established as a matter of law by
Supreme Court jurisprudence culminating in Barnes, that secondary
effects of proscribed conduct may be taken into consideration by a
court in evaluating the governmental interests justifying impingement
upon free speech rights even when, as in Barnes, there is no legislative history demonstrating that the lawmakers actually considered
secondary effects or any other specific factor (such as protecting
order and morality) in enacting the challenged law. 2
That decision would seem to have ignored a large body of literature and
case law finding that adult businesses do not invariably cause adverse
secondary effects in a community.2 2
The same court ruled six years later that Fulton County's adult
ordinance was unconstitutional because the purported legislative purpose in combating secondary effects was completely belied by a local
study performed by that very government showing that adverse secondary effects did not occur in the local adult clubs. 23 The court held that a
local legislator could not rely on foreign studies conducted in other jurisdictions at other times when those studies were shown to be inapplicable
to actual local conditions:
We do not think that Defendants had any reasonable justification for
amending Section 18-76 when the county's own studies negated the
very interests it purportedly sought to prevent .... We recognize that
a governmental entity is not required to perform empirical studies.
However, having done so, the Board cannot ignore the results. Local
studies, including those commissioned by the county itself, revealed
that the Clubs had less, up to half, the incidence of crime than establishments that did not offer nude dancing, property values had
increased in the Clubs' surrounding neighborhoods, and the physical
maintenance of surrounding buildings showed no quantifiable blight.
Accordingly, we find that it was unreasonable for Defendants to rely
21. Cafe 207, Inc. v. St. Johns County, 856 F. Supp. 641, 645 (M.D. Fla. 1994) (emphasis
added), aff'd per curiam, 66 F.3d 272 (11 th Cir. 1995).
22. See, e.g., Peek-A-Boo Lounge of Bradenton, Inc. v. Manatee County, 337 F.3d 1251,
1268-69 (11 th Cir. 2003); Flanigan's Enters., Inc. of Ga. v. Fulton County, 242 F.3d 976, 986
(11 th Cir. 2001) (per curiam); Enriquez et al., supra note 17, at 34; Daniel Linz et al., An
Examination of the Assumption that Adult Businesses Are Associated with Crime in Surrounding
Areas: A Secondary Effects Study in Charlotte, North Carolina, 38 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 69, 89
(2004); Daniel Linz et al., Peep Show Establishments, Police Activity, Public Place, and Time: A
Study of Secondary Effects in San Diego, California,43 J. SEX RES. 182, 190 (2006); Daniel Linz
et al., Testing Supreme Court Assumptions in California v. LaRue: Is There Justification for
ProhibitingSexually Explicit Messages in Establishments that Sell Liquor?, 7 COMM. L. REv. 23,
42 (2007).
23. Flanigan's,242 F.3d at 986-87.

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63:741

on remote, foreign studies concerning secondary effects when the
county's own current, empirical data conclusively demonstrated that
such studies were not relevant to local conditions.24
The Eleventh Circuit continues to cite all of these cases as if they
were entirely consistent and can be reconciled within a sensible legal
framework. Those sort of mental gymnastics are beyond the poor ability
of these authors.
In light of the conflict between the courts over the "easy" issues, it
should not be surprising that the courts fail to agree where the facts and
issues are more subtle. There is no consensus, for instance, regarding the
quality or quantity of evidence necessary to prove that the city's factual
justification-whether local or foreign-amounts to "shoddy data."
Neither does there seem to be any agreement as to what actually constitutes a secondary effect. Few people would disagree with the principle
that preventing crime and maintaining property values through responsible zoning are important governmental interests.2 5 However, many people would disagree with the idea that speech rights should be forfeited to
prevent litter or the theoretical possibility of tax evasion. Nevertheless,
the courts accept all of these justifications without questioning whether
the supposed benefit to society is worth the loss of First Amendment
rights.
A sea change in the law of secondary effects appeared to take place
in 2002 when the Supreme Court decided the case of City of Los Angeles
v. Alameda Books, Inc.2 6 The Court seemingly rejected a wholly deferential approach to local legislation when it adopted both procedural and
substantive standards for evaluating whether a government has adequately supported its restrictions on adult-entertainment with proof of
secondary effects. A plurality of the Court held that adult businesses
must be provided an opportunity to cast "direct doubt" on the factual
predicate underlying adult entertainment restrictions.2 7 The Court suggested two ways by which the legislative predicate could be challenged:
by showing that the government's "evidence does not support its rationale or by furnishing evidence that disputes the municipality's factual
findings. 2 8 Justice O'Connor, the author of the plurality decision, gave
24. Id. at 986 (citation omitted).
25. While some would argue that those substantial governmental interests should not trump
the First Amendment, the question seems to be well settled by the Supreme Court in favor of the
government's ability to regulate against secondary effects. See, e.g., Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc.,
501 U.S. 560, 567 (1991) (plurality opinion); City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S.
41, 52 (1986).
26. 535 U.S. 425 (2002).
27. Id. at 438-39 (plurality opinion).
28. Id. at 439.
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substantive content to what had previously been a vague test under
Renton:
We held that a municipality may rely on any evidence that is "reasonably believed to be relevant" for demonstrating a connection between
speech and a substantial, independent government interest. This is not
to say that a municipality can get away with shoddy data or reasoning. The municipality's evidence must fairly support the municipality's rationale for its ordinance. If plaintiffs fail to cast direct doubt
on this rationale, either by demonstrating that the municipality's evidence does not support its rationale or by furnishing evidence that
disputes the municipality's factual findings, the municipality meets
the standard set forth in Renton. If plaintiffs succeed in casting doubt
on a municipality's rationale in either manner, the burden shifts back
to the municipality to supplement the record with evidence renewing
support for a theory that justifies its ordinance.29
The Eleventh Circuit adopted and expanded on Justice O'Connor's
formulation of the secondary-effects standards and procedures-if only
temporarily-in Peek-A-Boo Lounge of Bradenton, Inc. v. Manatee
County.3 ° Under Peek-A-Boo Lounge, a local government "may rely
upon any evidence that is 'reasonably believed to be relevant' to its
interest in preventing secondary effects."'" However, the city "cannot
rely on 'shoddy data or reasoning' and its 'evidence must fairly support
[its] rationale.' "32 If the government comes forward with evidence in
support of a substantial governmental interest, the challenging citizens
must be given the opportunity to "cast direct doubt on this rationale"
with evidence of their own. 3 3 If the adult-business owner succeeds in
doing so, "the burden shifts back to the [city] to supplement the record
with evidence renewing support for a theory that justifies its
evidence." 34
The determination of whether a local government's evidence consists of shoddy data would seem to be relatively straightforward. One
might naturally equate "shoddy data" with unscientific or unreliable
information of the kind routinely rejected by the courts following
Daubert hearings or even a lesser standard that requires a modicum of
accuracy or truth. Daubert hearings evaluate whether expert testimony is
scientifically sound and generally accepted as reliable in the relevant
professional community.3" It is commonly recognized that Daubert anal29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Id. at 438-39 (citations omitted) (quoting Renton, 475 U.S. at 51-52).
337 F.3d 1251 (11th Cir. 2003).
Id. at 1269 (quoting Renton, 475 U.S. at 51-52).
Id. (quoting Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 438 (plurality opinion)).
Id.
Id. (quoting Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 439 (plurality opinion)).
See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592-94 (1993).
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ysis is simply a codification of the court's traditional role as the "gatekeeper" of record testimony.36 The courts have long evaluated
sociological evidence in all types of litigation from desegregation to
abortion cases. 37 The Eleventh Circuit has recognized the utility of sociological studies and statistics for many years:
Historically, beginning with "Louis Brandeis' use of empirical
evidence before the Supreme Court ...persuasive social science evidence has been presented to the courts." The Brandeis brief presented
social facts as corroborative in the judicial decisionmaking process.
The Brandeis brief "is a well-known technique for asking the court to
take judicial notice of social facts." It does not solve the problem of
how to bring valid scientific materials to the attention of the
court.... Brandeis did not argue that the data were valid, only that
they existed .... The main contribution ... was to make extra-legal
data readily available to the court."
This Court has taken a position that social science research does
play a role in judicial decisionmaking in certain situations, even in
light of the limitations of such research. 38
Like these other cases in which sociological data is relevant, evidence of adverse secondary effects should be subject to quantitative
proof: Do property values in the neighborhood actually decrease when
an adult business opens? Does crime really increase? What happens to
the incidence of HIV in the community? The doctrine of secondary
effects appears to contemplate an objective test of "reasonable belief,"
similar to the "reasonable man" standard lying at the very foundation of
the common law. One would expect, therefore, that a traditional trial
would be an entirely appropriate forum to consider secondary-effects
issues. Furthermore, the traditional burden of proof based on a preponderance of the evidence would seem to fit neatly with the burden-shifting framework created by Alameda Books and Peek-A-Boo Lounge. In
practice, however, secondary-effects trials are rare to non-existent, and
the actual treatment of secondary-effects theory is a far cry from the
Supreme Court's proclamations.
The authors are aware of only a single case in the United States
where secondary effects have been the subject of a full evidentiary proceeding.3 9 In Daytona Grand, Inc. v. City of Daytona Beach, Lollipop's
36. See Wendie Ellen Schneider, Case Note, Past Imperfect, 110 YALE L.J. 1531, 1539
(2001) ("Daubert places increased responsibility on judges to serve as gatekeepers ....").
37. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 161 (1973); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483,
494 n.Il (1954).
38. McCleskey v. Kemp, 753 F.2d 877, 888 (11th Cir. 1985) (en banc) (alterations in
original) (citations omitted), aff'd, 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
39. Most cases have been decided on the basis of summary judgments. One recent case was
decided on a motion to dismiss, with the court going so far as to say that discovery was not even
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challenged two Daytona Beach ordinances prohibiting nudity in general
and in proximity to establishments that serve alcohol.4" The effect of
those two ordinances was to require performers at Lollipop's to wear
more clothing than they, and their customers, might otherwise prefer.
Curiously, the City of Daytona Beach did not rely on the usual list of
foreign studies and reported cases to support its legislation. Instead, the
City relied almost entirely on past and present testimony from lawenforcement officers who thought that adult businesses caused an
increase in prostitution and were generally undesirable.4" Some of the
evidence was over twenty-years-old.42
At the district-court level, the club introduced evidence at a nonjury
trial that demonstrated that the city had relied on shoddy data when it
enacted zoning and nudity laws impacting adult businesses. The trial
court also found as a matter of fact that studies of actual local conditions, focusing primarily on crime, showed that there was no evidence of
secondary effects associated with adult businesses in Daytona Beach:
Plaintiffs have succeeded in their attempt to cast direct doubt on the
City's rationales for its ordinances. As persuasively demonstrated by
Plaintiffs' expert studies, the City's pre-enactment evidence consists
either of purely anecdotal evidence or opinions based on highly unreliable data. Most notably, the City's evidence lacks data which would
allow for a comparison of the rate of crime occurring in and around
adult entertainment establishments with the rate of crime occurring in
and around similarly situated establishments. Absent the context that
such a comparison might provide, the City's data is, as Plaintiffs
assert, "meaningless.' 43
The district court continued:
The evidence the City offered at trial to renew support for a
theory justifying its ordinances suffers from the same flaws as its preenactment evidence. Owing perhaps to a stubborn refusal to accept
the evolution in the law effected by Alameda Books and Peek-A-Boo,
the City's post-enactment evidence, like its pre-enactment evidence,
consists of either anecdotal evidence or opinions based on highly
unreliable data. As Dr. Fisher observed, the City fails, once more, to
compare any of its data of incidents occurring in and around nude
needed to conclude that secondary effects existed. See Deja Vu of Nashville, Inc. v. Metro. Gov't,
466 F.3d 391, 398 (6th Cir. 2006) ("Deja Vu is not entitled to discovery regarding secondary
effects. We have followed the Supreme Court in deferring to local governments' conclusions
regarding whether and how their ordinances address adverse secondary effects ....").
40. 490 F.3d 860, 862, 869 (11th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 1246 (2008).
41. See id. at 878.
42. See id. at 878 & nn.27-28.
43. Daytona Grand, Inc. v. City of Daytona Beach, 521 F. Supp. 2d 1264, 1279 (M.D. Fla.
2006), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 490 F.3d 860, cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 1246.
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dancing establishments with data of such incidents occurring in and
around similarly situated establishments.
In failing to renew support for a theory justifying its ordinances, the
City leaves the Court with only one option: to declare Ordinances 81334 and 02-496 unconstitutional and strike them accordingly. To
reach a contrary result would be at clear odds with the plain import of
Peek-A-Boo that gone are the days when a municipality may enact an
ordinance ostensibly regulating secondary effects on the basis of evidence consisting of little more than the self-serving assertions of
municipality officials. 44
The Eleventh Circuit utterly rejected the district court's factual
findings, 45 as well as the standard of proof employed at trial. "We do not
agree, however, with Lollipop's claim that either Alameda Books or
Peek-A-Boo Lounge raises the evidentiary bar or requires a city to justify
its ordinances with empirical evidence or scientific studies."'4 6 The Eleventh Circuit continued:
Here, Lollipop's argument that the City's evidence is flawed because
it consists of "anecdotal" accounts rather than "empirical" studies
essentially asks this Court to hold today that the City's reliance on
anything but empirical studies based on scientific methods is unreasonable. This was not the law before Alameda Books, and it is not the
law now.

The panel upheld Daytona Beach's anti-nudity ordinances without
requiring the government to produce any "empirical evidence," even in
the face of scientific proof that adult businesses do not cause adverse
secondary effects such as crime or urban blight in the community. " The
Eleventh Circuit declared that "anecdotal" evidence is sufficient to sustain an adult ordinance and that empirical studies are not required or
necessary to support such a law: "Rather, the City of Daytona Beach
could reasonably rely upon '[c]ommon sense,' 'its own experiences,'
'the

experiences

of

.

.

.

other cities,'

or city

officials'

local

knowledge."4 9
There is no question that the Court adopted an intentionally deferential approach as it tells us that is exactly what it had in mind. "Our
44. Id. at 1280.
45. It is clear that the Eleventh Circuit gave no deference to the trial court's findings of fact.
Instead, the review was effectively de novo as to both the law and the underlying facts. See
Daytona Grand, 490 F.3d at 870-71. That being said, the primary factual critique concerned the
use of "CAD" (Computer Automated Dispatch) or "CFS" (Calls for Service) data instead of
"UCRs" (Uniform Crime Report), which Lollipop's experts used. Id. at 882-83.
46. Id. at 880.
47. Id. at 881.
48. See id. at 880-82.
49. Id. at 881 (alterations in original) (citations omitted).
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review is designed to determine whether the City's rationale was a reasonable one, and even if Lollipop's demonstrates that another conclusion
was also reasonable, we cannot simply substitute our own judgment for
the City's." 50
Arguably, the Daytona Grand decision should have been impossible under the Eleventh Circuit's earlier pronouncements in Flanigan's
Enterprises,Inc. of Georgia v. Fulton County5 and Peek-A-Boo Lounge.
However, the Daytona Grand panel did not take issue with either of
those earlier decisions, and they remain good law.
Some might argue that Daytona Grand has superseded Flanigan's
and Peek-A-Boo Lounge and is now the controlling case for all secondary-effects challenges in Florida, Georgia, and Alabama. However, that
cannot be the case as one three-judge panel cannot overrule a prior
three-judge panel decision in the Eleventh Circuit.5 2
Since Daytona Grand, Flanigan's and Peek-A-Boo Lounge all
remain legally viable, it becomes necessary to try to reconcile them
despite the apparently divergent views on secondary-effects evidence.
Reconciliation is possible-but only just.
Depending upon the individual facts of each new case, the practitioner needs to pigeon-hole those facts into one of three categories corresponding to one of the three leading cases. For example, if the legislative
record includes local anecdotal testimony and that record is challenged
with local scientific studies, Daytona Grandwould appear to control and
the ordinance would survive a First Amendment challenge. If the legislature has relied only on foreign "Renton" studies and the adult industry
submits evidence of local scientific studies, it would seem that Flanigan's would apply to strike the adult ordinance. In situations where the
legislature has failed to support its law with either anecdotal testimony
or foreign studies, the law will be unconstitutional if local evidence
refutes the existence of adverse secondary effects. That is the outcome
required by Peek-A-Boo Lounge.
Daytona Grand would seem to have thrown our circuit into complete turmoil when examined in light of prior decisions such as Flanigan's and Peek-A-Boo Lounge. How then, does Daytona Grand
50. Id. at 882 (citing Peek-A-Boo Lounge of Bradenton, Inc. v. Manatee County, 337 F.3d
1251, 1273 (11th Cir. 2003)).
51. 242 F.3d 976 (11th Cir. 2001).
52. See, e.g., United States v. McKinnies, 165 F. App'x 851, 853 (2006) ("A prior panel
decision is binding precedent that only can be overturned by our Court sitting en banc.").
Lollipop's filed a Petition for Rehearing En Banc suggesting that the Daytona Granddecision had
effectively overruled Peek-A-Boo Lounge even though the panel had no authority to do so. The
petition was denied. Daytona Grand, Inc. v. City of Daytona Beach, 255 F. App'x 501, 501 (11 th
Cir. 2007).
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compare to decisions in other circuits? By now, the reader should not be
surprised to learn that the circuits are split and that the case law is all
over the place.
Some Courts follow the Eleventh Circuit's deferential approach and
find that the merest hint of a shred of anecdotal story-telling is sufficient
to sustain an adult ordinance. Indeed, several courts have gone so far as
to entirely disclaim any interest in actually finding out whether secondary effects are present or likely to occur in the future. In Commonwealth v. Jameson, Kentucky's highest court had the audacity to declare
that "it is irrelevant whether the local government is actually wrong
regarding the extent of all the secondary effects that have actually
occurred or may occur in the future." 53 That sentiment was shared by the
Seventh Circuit in DiMa Corp. v. Town of Hallie, where the court
opined that "DiMa's contradictory evidence would be highly probative if
our task were to discover the objective truth."54 That court ultimately
held that the district-court judge "properly rejected" expert testimony
and other evidence demonstrating that there was no correlation between
the plaintiff's establishment being open twenty-four hours a day and
crime "because it merely contradicts other evidence that the Hallie
Board could have reasonably relied upon.""
The Seventh Circuit seems to share the same detachment from logic
as the court in Daytona Grand. In G.M. Enterprises,Inc. v. Town of St.
Joseph, the court ruled that a local study which established that the surrounding county "[h]ad not experienced any major problems with adult
entertainment establishments,"5 6 an affidavit stating that property values
near the club had increased over time, an affidavit that established that
the majority of police calls regarding incidents at the club were generated during hours when no nude or semi-nude dance entertainment was
53. 215 S.W.3d 9, 32 (Ky. 2006) (emphasis added).
54. 185 F.3d 823, 831 (7th Cir. 1999). It could be argued that blind deference to local
legislators in the face of evidence that a secondary-effects justification is factually untrue is less
stringent than review under the rational-basis test. Cf City of Cleburne v. Clebume Living Ctr.,
Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 448 (1985) (striking a law as irrational because "mere negative attitudes, or
fear, unsubstantiated by" proper zoning-proceeding factors "are not permissible bases for"
discriminating); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 648 (1975) ("[T]he mere recitation of a
benign, compensatory purpose is not an automatic shield which protects against any inquiry into
the actual purposes underlying a statutory scheme."); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 449-50
(1972) ("[W]e ... cannot believe that in this instance Massachusetts has chosen to expose the
aider and abetter who simply gives away a contraceptive to 20 times the 90-day sentence of the
offender himself. The very terms of the State's criminal statutes, coupled with the de minimus
effect of §§ 21 and 21A in deterring fornication, thus compel the conclusion that such deterrence
cannot reasonably be taken as the purpose of the ban on distribution of contraceptives to
unmarried persons.").
55. DiMa Corp., 185 F.3d at 831.
56. 350 F.3d 631, 636 (7th Cir. 2003).

2009]

THE FIRST AMENDMENT IN CHAOS

offered, and a statement by the local sheriff that the volume of police
calls generated by the club was unrelated to nude dancing,5" were all
irrelevant because "Alameda Books does not require a court to re-weigh
the evidence considered by a legislative body." 58 The Seventh Circuit
also completely ignored the "shoddy data" analysis of Alameda. In
Gammoh v. City of La Habra,the Ninth Circuit ignored proffered expert
testimony that the studies on which the city relied were "flawed and
irrelevant" and did not conform to the methodological criteria suggested
by the appellants' expert, as that was "simply not the law." 59
Likewise, in Kentucky Restaurant Concepts, Inc. v. City of Louisville, the district court found that evidence challenging the reliability and
probity of the reports upon which the city relied, empirical studies conducted in other municipalities that found no connection between adult
uses and adverse secondary effects, and a compilation of police data
showing no local increase in crime did not disprove the theory that ordinance may reduce criminal activity.6 °
Other circuits would clearly come to a different result. One prime
example can be found in Abilene Retail # 30, Inc. v. Board of Commissioners.6 1 In that case, the appellate court reversed a summary judgment
that upheld the county's zoning ordinance against a challenge brought
by a local "adult bookstore."6 2 The Tenth Circuit found that there were
substantial issues on the record as to whether the legislative body had
adequate evidence of secondary effects before it when it passed the new
ordinance. 63 In particular, the studies cited in the ordinance preamble all
related to urban environments, and no evidence related those studies to
64
the decidedly rural environment in which this bookstore functioned.
Most importantly, the Tenth Circuit held that deferential review of the
57. Id. at 636.
58. Id. at 639.
59. 395 F.3d 1114, 1126 (9th Cir. 2005).
60. 209 F. Supp. 2d 672, 679-80 (W.D. Ky. 2002).
61. 492 F.3d 1164 (10th Cit. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 1762 (2008).
62. Id. at 1175-76.
63. See id.
64. Id. at 1175. Interestingly, the Tenth Circuit panel seemed particularly swayed by the
evidence of the plaintiff's expert, Dr. Dan Linz. See id. at 1187 (Ebel, J., concurring, joined by
McWilliams & Lucero, JJ.) ("Dr. Linz has bolstered this opinion with an academic, peer-reviewed
article that he wrote with others challenging the validity of the County's studies."). He is the same
expert whose opinions and methodology were savaged in Daytona Grand. See Daytona Grand,
Inc. v. City of Daytona Beach, 490 F.3d 860, 863 n.33 (11 th Cit. 2007) ("[A]t least three other
circuits have rejected ... attempts by plaintiffs to use studies based on CAD data to cast doubt on
an ordinance that the municipality supported with evidence of the sort relied upon by the City of
Daytona Beach .... Interestingly, Daniel Linz, one of the experts hired by Lillipop's, also coauthored the studies found to be insufficient in the two of these cases." (citations omitted)), cert.
denied, 128 S. Ct. 1246 (2008). The courts apparently reach different conclusions even when they
hear the same thing from the same experts.

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63:741

local government's decision did not mean that the Court must rubber
stamp any legislative pronouncement:
We are mindful that judicial review of an ordinance that implicates
the First Amendment "is not a license to reweigh the evidence de
novo, or to replace [legislators'] factual predictions with our own."
However, the Supreme Court has instructed that such deference to the
legislative policymaking role nevertheless "does not foreclose our
independent judgment of the facts bearing on an issue of constitutional law." Our role is to "assure that, in forming its judgments [the
legislature] has drawn reasonable inferences based on substantial
evidence."6 5
It is also noteworthy that the Tenth Circuit was entirely aware of
the fact that it reached a decision contrary to that of other circuits. In the
reported en banc decision, a dissenting judge specifically emphasized
the fact that the circuits were irreconcilably split:
Legally, the significance of this case is illustrated by the fact that
it opens not one, but two, splits with our sister circuits on important
questions of law concerning the amount of judicial deference due legislative judgments. First, the panel opinion sets a new and much
higher burden for municipalities under Alameda Books Step 1 than
has any other circuit court, and in the process creates a circuit split
with the Fifth Circuit. Second, unlike our sister circuits which afford
substantially more judicial deference to legislative judgments, the
concurrence's treatment of Alameda Books Steps 2 and 3 effectively
allows a jury to "veto" legislation whenever it concludes, by a preponderance of the evidence (that is, = 50.0001%), that the legislature's chosen path is erroneous.6 6
Other circuits have reached decisions that echo the Tenth Circuit's
ruling in Abilene Retail. In R. V.S., L.L.C. v. City of Rockford, the Seventh Circuit rejected the notion that a local government can rely exclusively on common sense or common experience to support a secondaryeffects finding:
While it is true that common experience may be relied upon to bolster
a claim that a regulation serves a current governmental interest, the
experience in this case falls short of satisfying the minimal evidentiary showing required by Alameda Books. Indeed, while courts may
credit a municipality's experience, such consideration cannot amount
to an acceptance of an "if they say so" standard.67
A district judge in Minnesota reached a similar conclusion on similar
65. Abilene, 492 F.3d at 1174 (alterations in original) (citations omitted).
66. Abilene Retail # 30, Inc. v. Bd of Comm'rs, 508 F.3d 958, 959 (10th Cir. 2007) (Gorsuch,
J., dissenting) (footnote omitted) (citations omitted).
67. 361 F.3d 402, 411 (7th Cir. 2004).
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evidence in 22nd Avenue Station, Inc. v. City of Minneapolis.68
Plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence to cast direct doubt on the
City's rationale. It has submitted both an expert affidavit and a peerreviewed study casting grave doubt on the reliability of the foreign
studies upon which the City relied. It has submitted its own recent
expert analysis of Plaintiffs impact on crime, property values, and
blight in its surrounding neighborhood, which shows that Plaintiff has
not caused the secondary effects that the City seeks to combat. The
City has provided no contrary evidence regarding the impact of 22nd
Avenue Station on its neighborhood. 69
What do the courts agree on in the wake of Alameda Books? The
lower courts seem to agree that, if there is no evidentiary record at all in
support of an ordinance, the law will fail under Alameda Books.7" The
courts also appear to agree that the evidence relied on by local government both in enacting adult-business regulations and defending them in
court need not be scientific or of Daubert-quality.7' This is true even if
the studies and testimony introduced by an adult business challenging
the regulation is of Daubert quality.72 Beyond that point, the cases find
no agreement and no meaningful guidance from the Supreme Court.
This conflict among the circuits is not limited to just the weight of evidence that is necessary to "cast direct doubt" on legislative findings, but
also the form of evidence that is even relevant to meeting these
standards.
In practice, the issue that most divides the lower courts is the sufficiency-of-the-governmental-interest prong. Under Renton and its progeny, a city or state need not conduct new studies or produce evidence
independent of that already generated by other municipalities before
enacting a secondary-effects-based law, "so long as whatever evidence
the [government] relies upon is reasonably believed to be relevant to the
problem that [it] addresses."7 3 But how a court determines if this standard is met is not self-apparent.
One of the most fundamental of these issues is the weight to be
given recent local scientific studies as compared to anecdotal accounts
or reports compiled many years ago in other jurisdictions which may or
may not have much in common with the community at issue. In Renton,
the Supreme Court determined that communities need not conduct their
68. 429 F. Supp. 2d 1144 (D. Minn. 2006).
69. Id. at 1150.
70. See, e.g., Peek-A-Boo Lounge of Bradenton, Inc. v. Manatee County, 337 F.3d 1251,
1268-69 (11th Cir. 2003); Giovani Carandola, Ltd. v. Bason, 303 F.3d 507, 515-16 (4th Cir.
2002).
71. See, e.g., Peek-A-Boo Lounge, 337 F.3d at 1268.
72. See Fantasyland Video, Inc. v. County of San Diego, 505 F.3d 996, 1002 (9th Cir. 2007).
73. City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 51-52 (1986) (emphasis added).
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own studies, but are free to rely on foreign studies, case opinions, and
the like.7 4 However, that does not fully answer the factual questions
allowed by Alameda Books.
What happens, for instance, when a community has actual experience with adult entertainment establishments operating for many years
and reliable data are available that show conclusively-to a scientific
certainty-that those businesses cause no unique harms in their communities? Can foreign studies trump actual local experience measured with
reliable statistics? Or put in the terms of Renton analysis, can foreign
studies and anecdotal information ever be "reasonably believed" in light
of local scientific evidence of Daubert quality showing that the government's information is factually incorrect?
As was seen above, that question has been answered differently
even within our own circuit. In Flanigan'sEnterprises, Inc. of Georgia
v. Fulton County, both the county and adult businesses commissioned
studies, which found that local adult clubs were not associated with
adverse secondary effects." The Eleventh Circuit found it was not reasonable for Fulton County to "rely on remote, foreign studies concerning
secondary effects when the county's own current, empirical data conclusively demonstrated that such studies were not relevant to local conditions."7 6 In contrast, in the Daytona Grand decision, the same court
found that anecdotal information was perfectly acceptable even in light
of empirical, local data that cast significant doubt on the reliability of
that information.7 7 In Jameson, the Kentucky Supreme Court expressly
rejected the Eleventh Circuit's suggestion that local studies had any particular value in evaluating secondary-effects claims: "We thus decline to
adopt the rationale offered by the eleventh circuit in Peek-A-Boo Lounge
wherein the court concluded that 'the constitutionality of an ordinance
will depend on local conditions."' 78 The timing of secondary-effects evidence has also hopelessly divided the Courts. That issue revolves around
when the evidence must be adduced by the government-at the time the
ordinance is enacted or at the time of trial?
Many courts have concluded that evidence in support of the government's position can be introduced at any time and at any stage of the
proceedings. Furthermore, there need not be any showing that the local
legislators were even aware of or concerned about the later-acquired evi74. Id. at 51.
75. 242 F.3d 976, 986 (11 th Cir. 2001).
76. Id. at 986 (emphasis added).
77. See Daytona Grand, Inc. v. City of Daytona Beach, 490 F.3d 860, 881 (11 th Cir. 2007),
cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 1246 (2008).
78. Commonwealth v. Jameson, 215 S.W.3d 9, 33 (Ky. 2006) (quoting Peek-A-Boo Lounge
of Bradenton, Inc. v. Manatee County, 337 F.3d 1251, 1272 (11 th Cir. 2003)).
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dence. In extreme cases, the evidentiary support for an adult ordinance
seems to have been discovered for the first time on appeal. That seems
to have been true in the case of FantasylandVideo, Inc. v. County of San
Diego, where the evidence at trial focused on the alleged association
between late-night crime and adult entertainment.7 9 While traffic and
noise were cited by the city as justification for the ordinance, it is apparent that neither side devoted much attention to this issue at trial and that
this issue did not serve as the foundation for the district court's decision.
Nonetheless, the appellate court seized on "noise and traffic" as the basis
for its conclusion that the plaintiff had failed to rebut the claimed secondary effects.8" Other Courts have reached a similarly extreme
conclusion."'
Other courts, however, come to the conclusion that in order for a
speech-restrictive law to be upheld, the secondary-effects record must be
made at the time of legislative enactment (in view of Renton's command
that the government must "rely" upon evidence reasonably believed to
be relevant to the problems that it is attempting to address). 82
Accordingly, in those jurisdictions that allow post-enactment secondary-effects substantiation, a litigant can appropriately "cast doubt
upon" those secondary effects articulated in a bill's legislative preambles but nevertheless find himself losing the constitutional challenge
when a novel secondary effect is used in court for the first time to justify
the law. This affords an opportunity for both government and deferential
courts to come up with justifications that would strain the reasonable
beliefs of even the most credulous of legislators.
A neutral observer might conclude that adult businesses are not litigating on a level playing field and that the usual rules of evidence and
burdens of proof have been ignored to fit law to policy. Surely, the
courts' interest in promoting due process and fundamental fairness
might be questioned where one litigant can ambush another with an
79. 373 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 1108 (S.D. Cal. 2005), aff'd, 505 F.3d 996 (9th Cir. 2007).
80. See Fantasyland,505 F.3d at 1002.
81. See, e.g., Fantasy Ranch Inc. v. City of Arlington, 459 F.3d 546, 560 (5th Cir. 2006);
Giovani Carandola, Ltd. v. Bason, 303 F.3d 507, 515 (4th Cir. 2002); Essence, Inc. v. City of
Federal Heights, 285 F.3d 1272, 1284-85 (10th Cir. 2002); Deja Vu of Nashville, Inc. v. Metro.
Gov't, 274 F.3d 377, 393 n.4 (6th Cir. 2001); DiMa Corp. v. Town of Hallie, 185 F.3d 823,
829-30 (7th Cir. 1999); Farkas v. Miller, 151 F.3d 900, 905 (8th Cir. 1998); Mitchell v. Comm'n
on Adult Entm't Establishments, 10 F.3d 123, 136-37 (3rd Cir. 1993).
82. See, e.g., Illusions-Dallas Private Club, Inc. v. Steen, 482 F.3d 299, 314-15 (5th Cir.
2007) (noting that legislature must actually rely on the evidence when enacting law); White River
Amusement Pub, Inc. v. Town of Hartford, 481 F.3d 163, 171-72 (2d Cir. 2007) ("Defendants
argue that they may rely on 'any evidence' of secondary effects, regardless of whether they
reviewed such evidence before or after enacting the Ordinance. We disagree."); Peek-A-Boo
Lounge, 337 F.3d at 1267 ("This Court has held that Renton requires at least some pre-enactment
evidence." (citing Ranch House, Inc. v. Amerson, 238 F.3d 1273, 1283 (1 1th Cir. 2001))).
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entirely new theory at trial or even on appeal. That is precisely what
happens when a local government is allowed to rely on "new" secondary
effects claims and previously undisclosed evidence after the adult business has completed its case in chief. That is a puzzling procedure not
found elsewhere in the law.
Further divisions appear all across the country on every issue
related to secondary-effects proofs. For example, the courts split over
whether the generally relied-upon secondary-effects reports examining
adult bookstores and live entertainment venues can be used to justify
regulations of "take-out" only facilities where there is no viewing of
adult entertainment on the premises.83
There is even a conflict among the circuits on an issue as seemingly
narrow as whether secondary effects can justify a governmental interest
in regulating a single instance of expressive nudity.84
The lack of clarity from the Supreme Court on these issues has led
to a point where there appears to be little or no scrutiny given to whether
an articulated governmental problem can truly be tied to "adult"
entertainment and where, irrespective of the Supreme Court's comments
in Pap's and Alameda Books, there really is little ability to challenge the
mere pretext assertion of the governmental interest of adverse secondary
effects.
The culmination of this judicial trend was reached in two recent
cases. In 5634 East HillsboroughAvenue, Inc. v. Hillsborough County,8 5
a district judge, expanding on the Daytona Grand decision, determined
that a litigant can never overcome the government's record as long as
there is any evidence - no matter the quality.
Once the County relied on evidence it reasonably believed to be relevant to the problem of adverse secondary effects, the burden shifted
to the Plaintiffs to "cast direct doubt" on the County's reasoning. This
cannot be accomplished, however, by simply providing reports and
testimony reaching a contrary conclusion such as those prepared and
given by Drs. Danner, Fisher, and Hanna, and Mr. Schauseil, all
experts retained by the Plaintiffs. Daytona Grand made it clear that
given the existence of different conclusions based on studies, either
empirical or anecdotal, the Court may not substitute its judgment for
83. Compare Encore Videos, Inc. v. City of San Antonio, 330 F.3d 288, 295 (5th Cir. 2003)
(per curiam) (cannot justify), with Z.J. Gifts D-2, L.L.C. v. City of Aurora, 136 F.3d 683, 687
(10th Cir. 1998) (can justify), and ILQ Invs., Inc. v. City of Rochester, 25 F.3d 1413, 1418 (8th
Cir. 1994) (can justify).
84. Compare BZAPS, Inc. v. City of Mankato, 268 F.3d 603, 606-07 (8th Cir. 2001) (they
can), with Tollis Inc. v. San Bernardino County, 827 F.2d 1329, 1333 (9th Cir. 1987) (they

cannot).
85. No. 8:06-cv-1695-T-26EAJ, 2007 WL 2936211, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 4, 2007), af'd, 294
F. App'x 435 (11 th Cir. 2008).
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the Board.8 6

This trend has reached its zenith in Deja Vu of Nashville, Inc. v.
Metropolitan Government,8 7 where the adult businesses were precluded
from even seeking discovery regarding secondary effects.
Deja Vu is not entitled to discovery regarding secondary effects. We
have followed the Supreme Court in deferring to local governments'
conclusions regarding whether and how their ordinances address
adverse secondary effects of adult-oriented establishments. It is clear,
for instance, that a local government does not need localized proof of
adverse secondary effects in order to regulate adult establishments.
Similarly, all that is needed to justify a regulation is a reasonable
belief that it will help ameliorate such secondary effects. Deja Vu
offers no authority entitling it to undermine this deference through
discovery.8 8
Other courts, out of principle or simple confusion, have completely
sidestepped all of these issues by refusing to "specify the methodological standards to which [a litigant's] evidence must conform" 89 in order
to successfully challenge the stated secondary-effects basis for the enactment of a speech-restrictive law. Things are pretty bad when a federal
court explicitly decides a case by not deciding. 9°
That leaves this Article where it started. The law of secondary
effects is a mess, and no amount of analysis will reconcile these cases or
bring the slightest amount of certainty or predictability to pending litigation. Arguably, the Supreme Court's fractured decisions in Barnes, City
of Erie, and Alameda Books have only made the situation worse. One
could hope for better guidance in an area of the law directly affecting
fundamental First Amendment rights.

86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Id. at *7 (footnote omitted).
466 F.3d 391 (6th Cir. 2006).
Id. at 398 (citations omitted).
See Gammoh v. City of La Habra, 395 F.3d 1114, 1127 (9th Cir. 2005).
See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Pooh Bah Enters., Inc., 865 N.E.2d 133, 159 (I11.
2006).

